Myanmar Military is a Terrorist Organization

On 1 February 2021, the military of Myanmar staged a coup, abruptly halting the democratic trajectory set by its civilian government. Since then, the people have faced not merely political repression, but a calculated campaign of terror. This is not rhetoric—it is legal, definable, documentable terror. The institution once tasked with safeguarding sovereignty now operates like a classic terrorist organization under both domestic and international legal frameworks.

Terrorism, despite lacking a universally binding definition under international law, has achieved conceptual clarity through various UN documents. The 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism defines it as "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes." The five critical components—intentional violence, targeting civilians, an audience, political motives, and the generation of fear—serve as a diagnostic lens.

Under Myanmar’s own Counter-Terrorism Law of 2014, the legal bar is even clearer. Section 3 defines terrorism to include acts causing death, serious injury, or destruction with the intent to intimidate or coerce. Critically, the law does not exempt state actors or military institutions from liability—an omission that today holds monumental implications.

In the 36 months following the coup, over 4,700 civilians have been killed and 26,000 arbitrarily detained, according to credible documentation from Amnesty International and the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP). Victims include children as young as 20 months and elderly individuals in their 80s. This is not collateral damage. It is systematic targeting. (The data as in SAC-M report of 2024. Current reported data is much more.)

In one well-documented incident, a five-year-old girl was fatally shot, and in another, a two-year-old lost both legs after junta forces opened fire. In Sagaing Region alone, dozens of villagers were tied, executed, and their corpses set alight—some booby-trapped with landmines, a technique disturbingly reminiscent of tactics used by the ISIS.

These are not isolated excesses. They form a consistent pattern of intentional violence designed to sow fear. Vehicle ramming against peaceful protestors, torture televised on state-controlled media, and hostage-taking of family members when political targets are not found—these are all hallmark terrorist behaviors. And they meet every legal criterion.

The 2014 Myanmar Counter-Terrorism Law, especially Section 5 and 7, explicitly includes acts that “intimidate a population or compel the government” as terrorism. Despite the junta’s attempt to brand the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) as terrorists, the inverse more accurately reflects the law.

Internationally, Myanmar is a signatory to major counter-terrorism conventions—the 1979 Hostages Convention, 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention, and 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention—yet its military flagrantly violates their spirit and letter. Though these treaties often exclude intra-state military actions, they still set normative standards. Meanwhile, the ASEAN 2007 Convention on Counter Terrorism, to which Myanmar is a party, imposes obligations that are incompatible with state-sanctioned terror.

The National Unity Government (NUG)’s designation of the military as a terrorist organization on 7 June 2021 is more than symbolic. It aligns with domestic law and international moral clarity. Conversely, the military junta’s designation of the NUG’s CRPH as terrorists on 8 May 2021 is a cynical maneuver to cloak aggression under the veil of legality.

The Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M) has compiled overwhelming evidence from UN Special Rapporteurs, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), and major human rights organizations, urging the global community to act. The call is unequivocal: recognize the military as a terrorist organization, enact comprehensive sanctions, cut arms and cash flows, and employ international legal mechanisms for accountability.

The principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), reaffirmed by the UN in 2005, obliges the international community to prevent mass atrocities when the state fails. Here, the state is the perpetrator. Here, the UN is also failing.

When night raids become routine, when toddlers are maimed, when protest leaders are abducted and tortured, and when entire villages are reduced to ash—then the state has become indistinguishable from the very threats it claims to defend against.

The global hesitation to confront such realities due to concerns over sovereignty or geopolitical balance is understandable—but increasingly untenable. The precedent set here will echo beyond Myanmar. It will speak to every fragile democracy, every authoritarian temptation, and every community pleading for protection under the law.

If the definition of terrorism means anything at all, it must also mean that uniforms and official insignias do not grant impunity. The world must call this military institution what it legally is: a terrorist organization.

(This piece is in reference to Special Advisory Council's Report with the same name)